This paper examines the effects of alternative congestion pricing systems, cordon pricing and congestion pricing for existing toll roads, using the network equilibrium model developed for the Osaka Metropolitan Area, Japan. Cordon pricing is more effective in reducing the total efficiency loss from traffic congestion, but produces relatively large amounts of toll revenue. On the other hand, pricing for existing toll roads keeps the loss in consumer surplus (and toll revenue) relatively low to attain the same level of efficiency gain as the cordon pricing.
Introduction
Road pricing is now considered as practical policy instrument for controlling traffic congestion, following successful implementations in Singapore, Norwegian cities and London. This has stimulated research on congestion pricing in more realistic settings than earlier research in this field. Notable developments in recent years include the analysis of second-best pricing in space, where trips generate from many locations and congestion levels vary across space. The spatial settings in the previous studies are classified into networks and continuous space. The majority are network models, which have been applied to actual cities for empirical estimation. May et al. (2000) applied a network simulation model of the city of route choice between toll roads and urban streets 1 . Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 formulates the problem to obtain the second-best congestion pricing, and specifies alternative schemes. Section 4 presents the results of a case study and discusses the relative effects of alternative systems. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2
The model
Urban areas are divided into I discrete zones, and trips are originated from and destined to zone centroids. We focus only on road transportation. The network consists of nodes and links where some nodes represent the zone centroids. We use A to define the set of links in the network, in which a x is the traffic volume of link a ( ) a A ∈ . Demand for car trips is elastic, and the demand function is given by ( ) rs rs D C , where rs C is the cost for a trip from r to s. There are several routes between r and s, and trip cost is defined as the sum of monetary cost and time cost, as follows 1 A recent paper by de Palma and Lindsey (2002) considers the problem of finding the optimal number and locations of a tolled road in a radial network. Although they provide interesting policy implications, the analysis is based on an artificial setting in that all residents are located on a single circumference (same distance from the center).
Suppose that the number of O-D trips is given by rs Q . User equilibrium of route choice is attained when no driver has an incentive to change the route. This is Wardrop's first principle that the trip costs in all routes actually used are equal and less than those which would be experienced by a single vehicle on any unused route. Let rs R be the set of available routes between r and s. Then user equilibrium requires that the following condition holds for all Each individual will make a trip as long as private marginal benefit exceeds trip cost. The private marginal benefit of the trip from r to s is given by the inverse demand function, 1 ( ) 
where the ( ) a a a t x x ′ that is shown in the bracket of LHS represents the congestion externalities that an additional flow on the link a imposes on all vehicles using the link. Eq. (10) is consistent with the general rule for social efficiency: social marginal benefit should be equal to (less than) the social marginal cost for used routes (for unused routes). Hereafter we use the expression "first-best" to denote the most efficient road use.
Comparing the above conditions with equilibrium conditions (5)- (8), we see that the first-best situation is decentralized if the toll at each link is determined in the following way
That is, the toll of each link should be equal to the congestion externality. Implementing this tolling scheme is practically infeasible since imposing tolls on all links requires prohibitive cost. This case does not provide an alternative policy but serves as a reference point for evaluating the performance of second-best pricing policies.
3
Second-best pricing policies
General problem
Suppose that tolls are levied on only a small portion of links in the network, due to social and technological constraints. The second-best pricing policy is characterized as the set of tolls for a subset of links in the network, which maximizes the social surplus subject to network equilibrium conditions. The problem to be solved is generally formulated as follows, (5)- (8), under given τ . Thus these are expressed as functions of τ . The optimal value of the social surplus obtained by solving the above problem must be smaller than that obtained by the first-best. If H A = , the solution to the above problem must coincide with the first-best. Below we describe the alternative pricing systems, each of which is a special case of the above problem.
Single cordon pricing
The single cordon pricing system is designed as follows: each vehicle is charged a fixed toll when it passes through the specified cordon surrounding the central area of a city. In this case, the set of links crossing the cordon line becomes H, the set of tolled links. A uniform toll equal to C τ is applied to all links in H. The problem of obtaining optimal single cordon pricing is formulated as follows, for all links in m h . For the problem of multiple cordon pricing, the control variable becomes
Thus, the constraints (13) are rewritten as follows (16a) , ,
Uniform pricing on existing toll roads
This is similar to the current system of levying a toll equal to 700 Yen at on-ramps to the toll roads. The current toll level is determined so that toll revenue covers expenses including maintenance cost and redemption of construction cost, so it is not intended to control congestion. We search for the optimal uniform toll level to minimize the loss of congestion in the road network as a whole. It is interesting to see whether the optimal toll is higher or lower than the current toll level. Our network includes links representing the on-ramps to the toll roads at which the uniform toll is levied. Therefore, the problem to be solved is formally equivalent to (14)(15) above if the set of tolled links, H, are replaced by on-ramps.
Zone pricing on existing toll roads
The toll road network is divided into several zones, and toll equal to H m τ is levied to vehicles using the road sections within the domain of m-th zone. This toll is charged when a vehicle uses a link representing an on-ramp in the corresponding zone, or a link crossing the boundary of the zone on toll roads. The constraints of the problem are described as in (16), that for multiple cordons, but the set of tolled links, m h , is given according to the above definition.
4
Case study of Osaka metropolitan area
Settings
The model is applied to the Osaka Metropolitan Area, which consists of 36 zones as shown in Figure 1 . Zones 1-27 belong to the jurisdiction of Osaka City, of which Zones 1-3 are identified as CBD. This area has networks of toll roads and urban streets. We construct a network with 241 nodes and 630 links, of which 276 links belong to toll roads. Figure 2 illustrates the toll road network 2 . The toll roads were constructed and are operated by the Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation. As shown in Figure 2 , the toll road network has a loop line and 7 radial lines, which currently extends 233.8 km in total length. About 890,000 vehicles use the toll roads on average per day. Three cordon lines to be examined later are indicated in the figures. The relations between the cordon lines in Figures 1 and 2 are evident. The link travel time function is specified as
where a f is free-flow travel time for link a, a K is traffic capacity of link a. We adopt the parameter values, 0.48, 2.82 ν γ = = , proposed in the manual published by the Japan Society of Civil Engineers.
We specify the form of the trip demand function as 2 We do not include the urban street network in the figure to avoid complication. 
4.2
No-toll equilibrium and first-best Table 1 shows the summary of solutions under no-toll equilibrium, the first-best optimum, and current toll system. The first-best optimum is attained when the toll at each link is set equal to the congestion externality. Note that the congestion externality for one trip increases with distance traveled. The congestion toll discourages long distance trips, so the average travel distance decreases from 9.52 km to 8.62 km. Two forces act to decrease the average travel time: reductions in congestion levels and travel distances. On average, users pay 672 Yen for a trip of 8.6 km. The gain from the first-best policy is 595 Million Yen, which is the difference in the values of social surplus between the first-best and the no-toll cases. This value is interpreted as the economic loss due to congestion for one day, since society loses this amount in the no-toll case by not internalizing congestion externalities. This value is also considered as the maximal gain that society may attain by controlling congestion. Hereafter we evaluate the second best policies by relative gains compared with this maximal gain, as follows The current toll system improves the value of social surplus by 267 Million Yen, for which the relative gain according to the above formula is equal to 44.8%. The current system contributes to the reduction of congestion more effectively than expected. Gain from tolling (Million Yen) 595 267 Table 1 : No-toll equilibrium, first-best optimum, and current toll system
Cordon pricing
We specify three cordon lines as shown in Figures 1 and 2 . We first examine the single cordon pricing whereby a uniform toll is charged at one of three cordons. The optimal toll is obtained by one-dimensional search in which the increment is100 Yen. For example, Figure  3 depicts the relation between toll level and social surplus for the Outer Cordon case. The problem has a well-behaved structure in that the optimal solution is uniquely determined. Table 2 shows the results for three alternative cordon-pricing systems. The optimal toll is larger as the cordon is located farther from the center. The gain from tolling is maximized in the Outer Cordon case. In this case, the optimal toll is 700 Yen, and the relative gain is 65.5%.
We next examine three-layered cordon pricing under which tolls are charged at three cordon lines. The optimal combination of tolls at three cordons is obtained by a grid search where toll levels at each cordon are varied for the range of 0-2000 Yen with increments of 100 Yen; the total number of combinations is 3 20 8000 = . Table 4 shows the results for the top 5 cases that are ranked according to the values of gain from tolling. The values of gain from tolling are similar among 5 cases, so are the toll levels. For the optimal combination, tolls are 200 Yen at the CBD cordon, 200 Yen at the Inner cordon, and 600 Yen at the Outer Cordon. 1000 Yen is charged in total to travel from outside Osaka city to the CBD by car. The gain from optimal three-layered cordon pricing is 76.8% of the maximal gain, which is good performance. Table 3 : Results for top 5 of three-layered cordon pricing
Congestion pricing for existing toll roads
We compute the optimal uniform toll for the Hanshin Expressway, where a uniform toll of 700 Yen is currently levied. As shown in Table 4 , the optimal uniform toll is 900 Yen, which is higher than the current toll. Next, we examine zone pricing for toll roads. The toll road network is divided into two zones, that is, inner zone and outer zone, and different tolls are levied for the use of toll roads within each zone. We consider three alternative plans concerning the division of zones, each of which uses one of the three cordon lines shown in the previous section as the boundary between inner and outer zones. Zone System A in Table 4 uses CBD cordon as the boundary, Zone System B uses the Inner Cordon, and Zone System C uses the Outer Cordon. Zone System C attains the largest gain, which is 53.8% of the maximal gain. Gains from congestion pricing for existing toll roads are smaller than those from the cordon pricing. This result is reasonable because the extent of trips controlled by pricing is smaller; it is possible to avoid payment in the case of pricing only at toll roads while cordon pricing captures all trips entering the central area. Note that the loss in consumer surplus under pricing for toll roads is much smaller than that under cordon pricing. For example, cordon pricing at the Inner Cordon shown in Table 2 and the Zone System A shown in Table 4 attain similar total welfare gains. However, losses in consumer surplus under cordon pricing and pricing for toll roads are respectively -314 and -95 (million Yen), which is a big difference. Toll revenue with the Inner Cordon is much larger (514 versus 386 million Yen). Table 4 : Congestion pricing for existing toll roads
Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of alternative congestion pricing systems, cordon pricing and congestion pricing for existing toll roads, using the network equilibrium model developed for the Osaka Metropolitan Area, Japan. Cordon pricing is more effective in reducing the total efficiency loss from traffic congestion. On the other hand, pricing for existing toll roads keeps the loss in consumer surplus low to attain the same level of efficiency gain as the cordon pricing. The difference in efficiency between cordon pricing and pricing for toll roads could be reduced by refining the design of the pricing system for toll roads, such as increasing the number of zones, differentiating the toll schedules by O-D pairs, etc. These extensions require developments of computing methods to obtain the optimal combination of tolls with a large number of dimensions, which is an important task for future research.
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